STATEMENT OF
HONORABLE DONALD J. DEVINE
DIRECTOR OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

before the

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMPENSATION
AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

on

FISCAL YEAR 1986 BUDGET PROPOSALS CONCERNING CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT, FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS, AND FEDERAL PAY

FEBRUARY 26, 1985

MADAM CHAIR AND MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE:

THANK YOU FOR INVITING ME TO APPEAR THIS AFTERNOON TO DISCUSS THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 1986 BUDGET PROPOSALS ON CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT, FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS, AND FEDERAL PAY.

CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT

A RECENT INDEPENDENT STUDY BY THE CONSULTING FIRM OF TOWERS, PERRIN, FORSTER, AND CROSBY FOUND THAT THE AVERAGE EMPLOYER COSTS OF PENSIONS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR—FOR THE HALF OF THE POPULATION WHICH HAS PENSIONS—WAS 18 PERCENT OF PAYROLL, COMPARED TO THE GOVERNMENT'S 28 PERCENT OF PAYROLL. EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, THE STUDY FOUND THAT THE PROVISION OF BENEFITS WAS VERY UNEVEN BETWEEN DIFFERENT SEGMENTS OF THE WORKFORCE. DATA SHOW THAT 45 PERCENT OF A COHORT OF NEW EMPLOYEES WILL ACTUALLY SUBSIDIZE THE RETIREMENT SYSTEM, AND ANOTHER 15 PERCENT WILL RECEIVE NO REAL BENEFITS. ALMOST 60 PERCENT WILL DO VERY POORLY, WHILE A RELATIVELY SMALL GROUP DOES EXTREMELY WELL. THE CIVIL

SERVICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM IS THE GOVERNMENT'S THIRD LARGEST ENTITLEMENT PROGRAM WITH AN OUTLAY OF APPROXIMATELY \$23 BILLION IN 1985. IT HAS A DYNAMIC UNFUNDED LIABILITY OF OVER A HALF A TRILLION DOLLARS. IT IS A SYSTEM BADLY IN NEED OF REFORM.

THIS ADMINISTRATION IS COMMITTED TO MAKING THAT REFORM FOR THE SAKE OF BOTH GOOD PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AND SOUND FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION. IN 1986, OUR PROPOSED RETIREMENT REFORMS WOULD REDUCE OUTLAYS BY \$731 MILLION AND INCREASE RECEIPTS BY \$269 MILLION. I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS EACH OF THESE REFORMS IN TURN.

TO REFLECT CHANGES IN THE COST OF LIVING. CURRENT LAW ENSURES THAT FEDERAL ANNUITANTS, UNLIKE MOST OTHER RETIREES OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT OR EVEN ACTIVE FEDERAL WORKERS, WILL BE COMPLETELY ISOLATED FROM ANY EFFECTS OF INFLATION, SINCE THEIR ANNUITIES ARE REQUIRED TO BE ADJUSTED EACH YEAR TO REFLECT FULL INCREASES IN THE COST OF LIVING AS MEASURED BY THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (CPI). CONSEQUENTLY, AS FEDERAL RETIREMENT BENEFITS HAVE RISEN AT A FASTER RATE THAN PAY, MANY RETIREMENT-ELIGIBLE INDIVIDUALS HAVE FOUND IT FINANCIALLY ADVANTAGEOUS TO LEAVE FEDERAL SERVICE. THIS DISINCENTIVE TO WORK HAS TAKEN A PARTICULAR TOLL ON EXPERIENCED AND VALUABLE SENIOR PERSONNEL. REMOVING

OUR APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM INVOLVES SEVERAL STEPS, STARTING WITH THE ELIMINATION OF THE COST-OF-LIVING ADJUSTMENT (COLA) NOW SCHEDULED FOR THIS DECEMBER. THIS COLA FREEZE WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH COLA FREEZES BEING PROPOSED FOR A NUMBER OF OTHER INDEXED PROGRAMS, INCLUDING MILITARY RETIRED PAY. THEN, BEGINNING WITH THE DECEMBER 1986 COLA, OUR

COLA AMOUNT WOULD BE THE LESSER OF THE INCREASE IN GENERAL SCHEDULE PAY OR THE CPI CHANGE TO GIVE RETIREES AND EMPLOYEES EQUAL TREATMENT. THAT COLA WOULD BE PAYABLE ON THE FIRST \$10,000 OF ANNUITY. PENSIONS OVER \$10,000 WOULD BE INCREASED BY 55 PERCENT OF THE COLA. IN SUBSEQUENT YEARS, THE \$10,000 BASE AMOUNT TO WHICH THE FULL INCREASE APPLIES WOULD BE ADJUSTED BY THE PERCENTAGE OF THE PREVIOUS YEAR'S COLA. THIS CHANGE WOULD BRING FEDERAL RETIREES INTO CLOSER ALIGNMENT WITH OTHER RETIRED PEOPLE, WHO TYPICALLY RECEIVE FULL COLA'S ONLY ON THEIR SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS, AND ONLY ABOUT ONE-THIRD OF THE COLA ON ANY PRIVATE PENSION PAYMENTS THEY RECEIVE.

SECOND, THE BUDGET PROPOSES TO ELIMINATE A PRACTICE UNDER OUR RETIREMENT SYSTEM VIRTUALLY UNKNOWN IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR—UNREDUCED RETIREMENT BENEFITS AS EARLY AS AT AGE 55. WE PROPOSE THAT CURRENT FEDERAL EMPLOY—EES WITH SUFFICIENT SERVICE CONTINUE TO BE ABLE TO RETIRE AS EARLY AS AGE 55, BUT BENEFITS WOULD BE REDUCED TO REFLECT THE COST TO THE RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF THIS EARLY RETIREMENT. FOR EACH YEAR THE EMPLOYEE IS UNDER AGE 65 AT THE TIME OF RETIREMENT, THE ANNUITY WOULD BE REDUCED BY 5 PERCENT. THIS REDUCTION WOULD NOT APPLY TO ANYONE WHO IS ALREADY 55, AND IN ORDER TO EASE ITS IMPACT ON THOSE NEAR RETIREMENT, THE REDUCTION WOULD BE PHASED IN OVER 10 YEARS. FOR INSTANCE, AN EMPLOYEE WHO IS NOW 54 COULD RETIRE AT 55 WITH AN ANNUITY REDUCTION OF ONLY 5 PERCENT. ONLY THOSE NOW 45 AND UNDER WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE FULL REDUCTION. LIKE THE COLA CHANGE, THIS PROPOSAL WOULD BRING FEDERAL RETIREES INTO CLOSER ALIGNMENT WITH RETIREES IN OTHER SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY, WHERE RETIREMENT AT AGE 55 WITH UNREDUCED BENEFITS IS RARELY PERMITTED.

THIRD, AGAIN FOLLOWING THE NORMAL PATTERN FOLLOWED IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, WE PROPOSE TO BASE ANNUITY COMPUTATIONS ON THE RETIREE'S HIGHEST FIVE YEARS OF EARNINGS, RATHER THAN THE HIGHEST THREE. PRIOR TO 1969, A PERIOD OF LOW INFLATION, THE HIGH-FIVE YEARS' SALARY WAS USED. SINCE THEN, COMPUTATIONS HAVE BEEN BASED ON THE HIGH-THREE. EMPLOYEES WHO ARE WITHIN THREE YEARS OF ELIGIBILITY FOR RETIREMENT WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED.

FOURTH, WE WOULD PHASE OUT OVER A FOUR-YEAR PERIOD THE RETIREMENT CREDIT CURRENTLY GIVEN FOR UNUSED SICK LEAVE. THIS TYPE OF BENEFIT IS NOT CNLY VERY EXPENSIVE BUT ALSO IS NOT TYPICALLY AVAILABLE TO NON-FEDERAL WORKERS.

OTHER EXISTING PROVISIONS IN SOCIAL SECURITY. THESE INCLUDE DELETING
THE GUARANTEED MINIMUM BENEFIT FOR FUTURE ANNUITANTS, PHASING OUT SPECIAL
BENEFITS FOR ADULT STUDENTS, AND CHANGING ELIGIBILITY RULES FOR SURVIVING
SPOUSES, FORMER SPOUSES, AND INSURABLE INTEREST BENEFICIARIES TO PARALLEL
MORE CLOSELY THE TREATMENT OF SIMILARLY SITUATED INDIVIDUALS COVERED BY
SOCIAL SECURITY.

SIXTH, WE WOULD REQUIRE THE POSTAL SERVICE AND THE D.C. GOVERNMENT TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE RETIREMENT FUND AN ADDITIONAL 2 PERCENT OF BASIC PAY EACH YEAR UNTIL THEIR PAYMENTS, PLUS EMPLOYEE DEDUCTIONS, ARE SUFFICIENT TO COVER THE DYNAMIC NORMAL COST OF THE RETIREMENT SYSTEM. THE D.C. GOVERNMENT AND THE POSTAL SERVICE ARE SUPPOSEDLY NOW SELF-SUPPORTING, WITH ANY FEDERAL SUBSIDIES CLEARLY IDENTIFIED AS SUCH. YET THESE TWO ENTITIES ARE CONTINUING TO RECEIVE MASSIVE HIDDEN SUBSIDIES THROUGH THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM.

FINALLY, AS A PART OF THE ONGOING EFFORT TO DISENTANGLE FEDERAL AND DIS-FRICT OF COLUMBIA AFFAIRS, WE PROPOSE TO EXCLUDE EMPLOYEES HIRED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AFTER SEPTEMBER 30, 1985, FROM THE FEDERAL RETIREMENT, LIFE INSURANCE, AND HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAMS.

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS

NOW I WOULD LIKE TO TURN TO THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS (FEHB) PROGRAM, WHERE WE ARE AGAIN PROPOSING A MAJOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM. THE PRESENT FEHB PROGRAM HAS MANY VERY GOOD FEATURES, ESPECIALLY ITS WIDE CHOICF OF PLANS AVAILABLE. TO ENHANCE THIS MOST ATTRACTIVE FEATURE, WE HAVE PROPOSED A SYSTEM THAT IS POPULARLY KNOWN AS A "VOUCHER" SYSTEM. WE BELIEVE THIS APPROACH CAN MAKE A VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO THE FEHB PROGRAM.

UNDER THIS SYSTEM, OPM WOULD NO LONGER NEGOTIATE DETAILED CONTRACTS WITH CARRIERS. INSTEAD, ANY CARRIER THAT IS PREPARED TO MEET CERTAIN MINIMAL REQUIREMENTS WOULD BE ADMITTED TO THE PROGRAM, AND WOULD BE FREE TO OFFER ANY NUMBER OF PLANS IT WISHED. ALL PLANS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO INCLUDE CATASTROPHIC COVERAGE, BUT CARRIERS WOULD OTHERWISE BE FREE TO DESIGN THEIR BENEFIT PACKAGES IN WHATEVER WAY THEY THINK WOULD ATTRACT THE MOST ENROLLEES. ENROLLEES WOULD RECEIVE INFORMATION TO HELP THEM IN SELECTING THE PLAN BEST SUITED TO THEIR NEEDS. PARTICIPATION BY A WIDER RANGE OF PLANS WOULD INCREASE THE NUMBER OF CHOICES AVAILABLE TO ENROLLEES, FURTHER SHARPENING THE COMPETITIVE FORCES THAT HAVE MADE THE CURRENT PROGRAM SUCCESSFUL.

THE GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTION WOULD NO LONGER BE CAPPED AT THE CURRENT 75

PERCENT OF A PLAN'S PREMIUMS SO ENROLLEES WOULD NO LONGER BE PENALIZED

FOR ENROLLING IN A LOW-COST PLAN. ENROLLEES WOULD EVEN BE ABLE TO RE
CEIVE A REBATE IF THE PREMIUM FOR THE PLAN THEY CHOOSE IS LESS THAN THE

GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTION. THE GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTION WOULD NO LONGER BE

DETERMINED BY THE PREMIUM COSTS OF PARTICULAR PLANS, BUT WOULD INSTEAD BE

BASED ON THE DOLLAR AMOUNTS OF THE AVERAGE GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS FOR

SELF-ONLY AND SELF-AND-FAMILY COVERAGES IN THE YEAR PRIOR TO INAUGURATION

OF THE VOUCHER, ADJUSTED IN FUTURE YEARS BY PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN A GENERAL

PRICE INDEX.

FEDERAL PAY

THE BUDGET PROPOSES A ONE-TIME REDUCTION IN PAY OF 5 PERCENT, EFFECTIVE IN JANUARY OF 1986, FOR FEDERAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES. AS YOU RECALL, DURING THE RECESSION, LABOR UNIONS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR RENEGOTIATED THEIR CONTACTS AND TOOK CUTS TO HELP THEIR INDUSTRIES GET BACK ON THEIR FEET AGAIN. IT SEEMS ONLY APPROPRIATE THAT COVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, TOO, SHOULD CONTRIBUTE IN A SIMILAR WAY TO HELP THEIR EMPLOYER AND TO SHARE IN CUTTING THE COST OF GOVERNMENT. A CORPORATION WITH A \$200 BILLION RED INK BALANCE AND A \$500 BILLION UNFUNDED PENSION LIABILITY SURELY IS A BUSINESS IN TROUBLE. WE MUST ALL SHARE IN PUTTING OUR HOUSE BACK IN ORDER.

THANK YOU. I WOULD BE HAPPY TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS THE SUBCOMMITTEE MAY HAVE.

TESTIMONY BY REP. MICHAEL D. BARNES
BEFORE THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMPENSTION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
ON THE EFFECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FY 86 BUDGET PROPOSALS
ON FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND RETIREES.

February 26, 1984

It is always a privilege to appear before this Subcommittee and its distinguished Chair. Today it's also a heavy responsibility. The decisions that this Subcommittee will make in the next week may well be pivotal to the future of Federal service in light of what the Administration has proposed in its budget.

At the outset, let me join with the Chair and with my co-Chairman of our Federal Government Service Task Force, Vic Fazio, in rejecting the proposal to cut Federal pay by 5 percent. In my when, this pay cut could be the fatal blow that crushes the spirit of public service in our country. The reasons are many.

On a number of ocassions, I have spoken about the impact of previous cuts proposed by the Administration and adopted by Congress on the morale of the Federal worker. I have been genuinely alarmed by the degree to which career public servants have become discouraged. ke've already lost too many of our very finest Federal employees.

What happens if youth no longer want to serve?

But I am also distressed by the reaction I've found among young people from our Nation's finest universities, colleges, and graduate schools. Most of them reject the premise that it's still possible to build a fruitful career in public service. Young people no longer regard Federal service as an exciting, honorable vocation.

In short, if we do not support a strong Federal service, we simply devalue it. John Kennedy's call for a Federal service that is a "lively career", his challenge to young Americans to serve, to build a secure American future, now seems the faintest echo in the public's mind.

When we devalue pay we devalue Federal service.

We have devalued Federal pay for eight straight years. Federal pay laws require government to pay Federal workers amounts comparable to those received by their private sector counterparts. We seem to forget that when we cut pay we trade a measure of quality for that reduction. Since 1978, inflation-fed deficits obliged government to invent every conceivable excuse for holding pay below the level of comparability. Year after year, pay cuts—and these were pay cuts because the value of Federal pay did not come close to keeping pace with inflation—dragged Federal pay so far behind comparable private pay that the entire pay-setting process became an embarassment.

We are embarassed, not because the Bureau of Labor Statistics survey is wrong, but because deficits make us helpless to put the matter right, to obey the law, and to tradeoff pay with minimal damage to the quality of service. We risk making career paths in Federal service a walk into no man's land.

There is no justification for a 51 pay cut.

The pay cut's advocates believe that the reduction can be justified for four reasons: a) deficits create a national emergency that justifies such drastic measures, b) workers in the private sector have had to endure similar cuts in pay in the last year, c) Federal quit rates are several times less than those in the the private sector, d) surveys that show Federal workers are paid less than private workers are wrong because Federal pay should be compared to the average pay of all workers—not just workers in enterprises similar to the Federal government.

Vic Fazio wants to speak to the point about private wage givebacks—and also has comments on the ludicrous quit rate analysis prepared by the Office of Personnel Management. My testimony focuses on pay-cut proponents' other two arguments.

Recent work done by our Federal Government Service Task Force provides evidence that a 5% pay cut for Federal workers could precipitate a national emergency in its own right. I don't think the best way to fight one National emergency is to create another one.

The Task Force analysis compares average private pay to Federal pay.

I do not doubt the accuracy of existing comparability surveys. Nevertheless, we decided to examine what would have happened in the last ten years to Federal pay and benefits had--as pay-cut proponents suggest--the Federal government paid its workers the same raise received by the average private sector worker. Please note we're not talking about the average raise for white collar employees or for employees in larger firms. We're just talking about the average worker.

The results of this analysis yield some important insights about Federal pay practices. Using an average private pay raise as a baseline, we found that the Federal government had already saved \$12.3 callion from 1977 through 1985—an average of \$1.35 billion per year by limiting pay increases to well under average annual increases in the private sector. (See chart no. 1, appendix).

For the average Federal worker these savings translated into an out of pocket loss of \$22,330 for the period. That's quite a premium to pay for the privilege of working in the public service. For many, it probably meant that that they could not afford to send a child through college or put aside something extra for retirement. (See charts no.s 2,3 and 4).

If we cut Federal pay by 5% in FY 86, the gap would rocket up to just under \$30,000--a loss of \$7500 in one year alone. That's \$7500

Approved For Release 2011/01/14: CIA-RDP89-00066R000900080019-8 less than Federal workers would have received had they gotte: pay raises equal to those paid to average private sector workers. (See chart nc. 3). In 1986, therefore, the gap between Federal and private pay will be 11.9%--a 5% cut and a 6.9% advance for the average private sector employee.

Pay cuts, like deficits, snowball

We have begun to realize—having learned the hard way—that unchecked deficits tend to snowball. Before it's too late, we ought to realize that the same lesson applies to payouts. We make these cuts in one year, and the reduced salary base keeps on rippling throughout an employee's career and on into retirement. By reducing pay below private sector levels for eight consecutive years, we have amplified this initial ripple into a wave that is dramatically reducing lifetime and retirement earnings.

These are not speculative or imaginary earnings, but very real dollars that Federal employees would have earned had they received the same raise as the average private sector employee for the last ten years. (See chart no. 4).

The snowball keeps right on rolling through the retirement years.

Pay cuts directly affect Federal annuities, particularly for employees at the end of their careers. Pay cuts even more heavily damage Federal employees who defer their retirement to remain in Federal service. Our analysis shows that each year that a retirement eligible employee experiences an additional pay cut cumulatively adds to the amount of pay and retirement benefits he or she loses. This fact is not unknown to senior employees now leaving government. (See tharts no. 5 & 6).

An average Federal employee who retired from Federal service in 1977, lost 3% of his or her annuity because pay was held below the average private sector increase. (See profile of losses for 1977 retiree, chart no. 8). The average 1978 retiree lost 5.8% of the arnuity. (chart no. 9). The average 1979 retiree: 3.4%. The average 1980 retiree: 4%. Note that during these years, Federal pay stayed within shouting distance of average private pay. (Charts no.s 10 & 11).

Then, beginning in 1981, the percentage of annuities lost began to climb dramatically as pay began to really lag behind. In 1981: the percentage of annuity lost moved into double digits to 10.8%; then to 10.9% in 1982, up to 11.6% in 1983, and 11.7% in 1984. This year the gap, even without a pay cut, will explode to 15.8%. And, if we go along with a 5% pay cut rather than the private sector increase we will be short-changing our average 1986 retiree by 21.7%. (See chart no. 5). These percentages apply to the amount of annuity lost from the date of retirement to the present, not simply to the impact of pay withheld on the retiree's annuity at the time of retirement.

But the effects on initial annuities are equally serious. The 1977 retiree lost \$303.00 of his or her annuity. By 1981, the average

initial loss was over \$1,000 more (\$1347.00). Last year, pay cuts cost the 1985 retiree \$2298.37. It's small wonder that the average 1985 retiree who had carefully planned for retirement over the past ten years left government disappointed, if not embittered. The 1986 retiree can look forward to an initial annuity of \$3012 less than he or she would have received through average private sector pay raises. In other words, the loss to the initial pension has doubled since 1581. (See Chart no.s 6 & 7).

Recent retirees have been the hardest hit.

Three-quarters of a million (non-postal) employees retired between 1977 and 1985. This group took the brunt of the Federal pay cuts. The later an employee retired during this period the harder he or she was hit. (See chart 13). A 1978 retiree lost a combination of \$8,161 to pay cuts during the last ten years. In 1981 this combined total loss had grown to \$15,654 for an employee retiring that year. But hang on to your hats, because next year, if we cut pay by 5%, the 1986 retiree will have lost a combined total of \$32,749. (See Chart 14).

Conclusions


No one suggests that Federal employees should not share the burdens of deficit reduction, but the clear and convincing evidence, Madam Chair is that they have done more than their fair share and will continue to do so even when we reject this irresponsible proposal to cut Federal pay. What I have tried to do this afternoon is demonstrate that the idea of cutting pay was not discovered yesterday. We have cut pay. We have burdened Federal employees over the last ten years as no other group of workers in our society. We haven't always acced responsibly in cutting pay in the past, but neither have we faced the destruction of what can continue to be the world's finest civil service.

I thank my colleague for his patience in letting me go through this analysis. I know that he has several critically important comments to add about the Administration's proposals on Federal retirement. Let me emphasize that the annuity losses I discussed were the indirect consequences of withdrawing wage increases. As heavy as those losses were, we have to recognize that Congress made direct cuts to Federal retirement of over 10% since 1977. In this context, I think it's clear that Congress must continue to reject efforts to reduce the Federal retirement system. In my view, the Administration's proposals cut retirement is not only a breach of faith with Federal employees and retirees, but a direct attack on a system of public service that serves this country well.

Once again, thank you for the opportunity to share these views with the Subcommittee. After my colleague makes his presentation, I'm sure we will be happy to try to answer any questions that you may have.

CHART NO. 1

PAY + RETIREMENT SAUINGS




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BUDGET SAVINGS


| 78 | 812 |
|----|------|
| 79 | 609 |
| 80 | 1024 |
| 81 | 1912 |
| 82 | 1421 |
| 83 | 1748 |
| 84 | 1893 |
| A5 | 2353 |

CHART NO. 2

PRIVATE V. FEDERAL PAY





PAY EARNED W. PRIV. INCR.



| | BS AV. SALARY | W. AV. PRIV. INCR. | PAY LOST |
|----|----------------|--------------------|--------------|
| 76 | 16352 | 16891 | 539 |
| 77 | 17170 | 18175 | 1005 |
| 78 | 17995 | 1 9 629 | 1634 |
| 79 | 1 89 84 | 21121 | 2137 |
| 80 | 20313 | 22346 | 2033 |
| 81 | 22162 | 24558 | 2396 |
| 82 | 23225 | 25781 | 2 536 |
| 83 | 24154 | 26946 | 279 2 |
| 84 | 25000 | 2813 2 | 3132 |
| 85 | 25875 | 29961 | 4086 |
| 86 | 24581 | 32028 | 7447 |

CHART NO. 4






| GS AV. SAL | ARY W. AV. PRIV. INCR. | PAY LOST | CUM. PAY LOS? |
|------------------|------------------------|--------------|---------------|
| 78 17995 | 19629 | 1634 | 1634 |
| 79 18984 | 21121 | 2137 | 2137 |
| 80 20313 | 22346 | 2033 | 203 3 |
| 81 . 22162 | 24558 | 2396 | 2396 |
| 82 23 225 | 25781 | 2536 | 2536 |
| 83 24154 | 269 46 | 279 2 | 279 2 |
| 84 25000 | 28132 | 3132 | 3132 |
| 85 25875 | 29961 | 4086 | 4086 |
| 86 24581 | 32028 | 7447 | 7447 |

CHART NO. 5

PAY LOSS REDUCES ANNUITY




* ANNUITY LOST

| 77 | 3.80 | |
|------------|-------|--|
| 78 | 5. 80 | |
| 79 | 3.40 | |
| 80 | 4 | |
| 81 | 10.80 | |
| 82 | 10.90 | |
| 83 | 11.60 | |
| 84 | 11.70 | |
| 85 | 15.80 | |
| B 6 | | |
| | | |

CHART NO. 6

LOST \$ AT RETIREMENT



INITIAL LOSS


| 77 | 303. 18 |
|----|------------------|
| 78 | 565. 31 |
| 79 | 362. 81 |
| 80 | 454.50 |
| 81 | · 1347.75 |
| 82 | 1426.50 |
| 83 | 1572.18 |
| 84 | 1586. 25 |
| 85 | 2 298. 37 |
| AK | = 227 27 |

g.

CHART NO. 7

TOTAL RET. & LOST(PAY)

CHART NO.




PAY RESTRAINED

| 7 7 | 496. 31 |
|----------------|----------|
| ⁷ 8 | 776.58 |
| 79 | 470.22 |
| 3 Ø | • 541.74 |
| 31 | 1477.57 |
| 32 | 1480.88 |
| 33 | 1599. 70 |
| 34 | 1586. 25 |
| 8 5 | 2298. 37 |
| | |

CHART NO. 8

LOSS PROFILE 1977 RETIREE



LOST/YEAR

| 77 | 303 |
|----|-------------|
| 78 | 3 25 |
| 79 | 360 |
| 80 | 409 |
| 81 | 463 |
| 82 | 5 03 |
| 83 | 523 |
| 84 | 541 |

CHART NO. 9

PROFILE OF 1978 RETIREE





CHART NO. 9

| | 1980 RETIREE | 1979 RETIREE | 1978 RETIREE | 1977 RETIREE |
|----|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| 77 | | | | 30 3 |
| 78 | | | 565 | 325 |
| 79 | | 362 | 6 26 | 360 |
| 80 | 454 | 412 | 712 | 409 |
| 81 | 514 | 466 | 805 | 463 |
| 82 | 5 58 | 507 | 875 | 503 |
| 83 | 580 | 526 | 9 09 | 523 |
| 84 | 600 | 545 | 941 | 541 |

CHART NO. 10


PROFILE OF 1979 RETIREE



| | 1981 RETIREE | 1982 RETIREE | 1983 RETIREE | 1984 RETIREE |
|-----------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| 81 | 1347 | | | |
| 82 [.] | 1465 | 1426 | | |
| 83 | 1522 | 1482 | 1572 | |
| 84 | 1575 | 1534 | 1627 | 158£ |

CHART NO. 11

PROFILE OF 1980 RETIREE




RET. . LOST

| 80 | 454 |
|----|-----|
| 81 | 514 |
| 82 | 558 |
| 83 | 580 |
| 84 | 600 |

CHART NO. 12

RETIREE COHORTS \$ LOSSES



| | PAY LOST | ANNUITY LOST | TOTAL LOST |
|----|----------------|--------------|------------|
| 78 | 3178 | 5436 | 8614 |
| 79 | 5315 | 2821 | 8136 |
| 80 | 7348 | 2708 | 1005€ |
| 81 | , 9 744 | 5910 | 15654 |
| 82 | 12280 | 4442 | 16722 |
| 83 | 150 72 | 3199 | 18721 |
| 84 | 18204 | 1586 | 19790 |
| 85 | 229 20 | 2298 | 24588 |
| 86 | 29737 | 4188 | 33925 |